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Introduction
Saving money for the future is among the most central economic decisions private households have to make. Therefore, the decision how to split available income between saving and consumption has always been of major interest in economic research. Accordingly, there is a large literature both theoretical and empirical trying to explain the savings behavior of economic agents (see e.g. Schunk, 2009 for an introduction). Given the complexity of the saving decision, research focuses on disentangling the importance of certain factors that inuence saving behavior. These include a great number of economic, psychological, sociological, and institutional factors. Browning and Lusardi (1996) provide a very comprehensive survey on consumption and saving. They list a total of nine possible motives why people save, including the precautionary, the life-cycle, the intertemporal substitution, and the enterprise motives. Disentangling the importance of one single motive is extremely dicult. However, it is agreed that the uncertainty surrounding income (and expenditures) is one of the main determinants.
The early theoretical work on consumption and savings faced the problem that a realistic representation of the savings decision (based on realistic preferences and/or stochastic income, among others) is very dicult to solve analytically. One way to deal with this is to introduce a more tractable utility function. Following this approach and using quadratic utility functions, the Certainty Equivalent model was developed (Deaton, 1992) . However, the results obtained with this model are not able to explain several empirical observations regarding savings (see for example Carroll, 2001 ). Thus, the second way taken to model consumption behavior was to solve the complicated model numerically and not analytically. This approach resulted in the Buer Stock Savings Model (Deaton, 1991; Zeldes, 1989 ) which predicts that consumers should build up a buer stock of savings to prepare themselves for future negative income shocks. This model forms the theoretical base for the paper at hand.
Besides empirical research (see for example Carroll, 1997) , the latter model also motivated a number of laboratory experiments. Such experiments allow a high degree of control over the decision environment and, thus, are particularly useful for testing the predictions of this model. More specically, uncertainty can more easily be disentangled from other determinants of saving behavior. In a pioneering experiment, Hey and Dardanoni (1987) found that subjects were unable to consume and save optimally as predicted by economic theory, but that the comparative static predictions of the theory hold nevertheless. This result was conrmed by Carbone and Hey (2004) who also report signicant over-reactions to changes in risk. The experimental analysis by Brown et al. (2009) introduces the possibility of learning how to save optimally. They nd that both social learning (by seeing the decisions of other participants) and individual learning (by repeating the sequence of decisions seven times) improve the quality of decision making.
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This paper builds on the experimental design by Brown et al. (2009) and aims to investigate what kinds of information exactly inuence the agents' decision. What should people know about the random process aecting future incomes in order to make optimal decisions? Do other people's beliefs about the future income already aect behavior positively -or do subjects need to be informed about others' choice to improve their consumption decisions as found by Brown et al. (2009) ? Furthermore, since the future income is aected by various economic events (like unemployment or changes in tax policy), subject's connotation of these events might also aect their consumption. Accordingly, we test whether the framing of the source of the income shock has an inuence on behavior.
Model
The model used for the paper at hand is a Buer Stock Saving Model and largely follows Brown et al. (2009) , who in turn base their parameters on empirical evidence reported by Carroll et al. (2000) . Consumers live for 30 periods. In each of these periods, subjects earn a stochastic income and have to decide how to allocate their cash-on-hand between saving and consumption. The utility function is a CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) one and incorporates a habit stock into the calculation:
The following table gives the variables used in the model: The inclusion of a habit stock (H t ) into the calculation of course makes early consumption less attractive as it decreases the utility of future consumption. As a consequence, early saving becomes more attractive even above the need to insure oneself against future negative income shocks. The consumer maximizes his expected lifetime utility, leading to the following maximization problem:
In order to keep the experimental task manageable, the time preference factor is assumed to be 1 and is therefore omitted. The habit stock develops according to the subjects' consumption:
where σ is the habit stock's depreciation rate. This rate indicates how persistent the habit stock is. The higher σ, the slower the habit stock decreases back to zero and the more important is it to incorporate it into one's calculation. In this model, no borrowing is allowed (i.e. S t ≥ 0). To simplify computation, it is convenient to divide all variables by xed income P s , thereby eliminating the xed income variable. Lower case variables denote variables where this division has taken place. A recursive specication of current and future utility can now be written as a function of only two variables, namely h t−1 and x t . The optimal value function is then
Subject to constraints
Note that the rst constraint implies that there is no borrowing; subjects can only spend their available cash-on-hand which is dependent on past savings and current income.
Following the parameter specication used by Brown et al. (2009) , the utility function is adapted to include some scaling parameters, and parameters were chosen such that ρ = 3 and γ = 0.6. The following utility function was therefore used in the experiment:
Furthermore, the stochastic income shock has to be specied. The income shock η is chosen to be lognormally distributed with a standard deviation of σ 2 = 1: logη N (−0.5, 1). This results in a mean income shock of E[η] = 1. The growth rate of the xed income is set to be constant at 5% per period.
The habit stock's depreciation rate σ is 0.3 which signies a slow decrease of the habit stock over time.
The starting habit H 0 is set to 10. receive the information that their income is subject to a random adjustment factor and that this adjustment factor is drawn independently in each period. To illustrate this, subjects are given three example draws of the income shock over all 30 periods. To test what a certain amount of spending would mean in terms of Euro payo, subjects could use a Euro calculator which was implemented in the decision screen.
The use of this calculator is recorded for future analysis. Before each decision, subjects have to state a belief about this period's adjustment factor. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the decision screen.
In total, we varied three treatment dimensions: The specics of information subjects receive about the random process determining their income (Info treatments), the availability of other subjects' beliefs about the current period's adjustment factor (Belief treatment), and the framing of the source of income shocks, i.e., the framing of the random adjustment factor (Frame treatments).
We implemented four Info treatments in addition to the baseline treatment (Base) described above.
In treatment LowInfo, subjects do not receive any example draws of the income shock. Treatments 1 See the Appendix for a full set of instructions.
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PointInfo and IntervallInfo add a point estimate and an interval estimate of the random variable to the three example draws, respectively. The HighInfo treatment implements the most detailed information concerning the income shock and adds the density function of the random variable, a statement that the income shock is always larger than 0 but will be smaller than 1 most of the time, and the 90% condence interval for the random variable.
Figure 1: Screenshot of the decision screen
The second treatment dimension varies the framing of the random process generating subjects' income. The three framings identify changes in tax policy (TaxFrame), unemployment (JobFrame), or the general economic development (EconFrame) as the source of income shocks.
Finally, the communication of other subjects' beliefs about the income shock is used as a treatment variable. In treatment Belief, subjects are randomly assigned to groups each consisting of ve subjects; this assignment is kept throughout the experiment. Before each of the 30 periods, subjects are informed about the beliefs of their fellow four group members.
The experiment was conducted computer-based and took place at the Essen laboratory for experimental economics (elfe) at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, in October and November 2011.
Participants were recruited via the program ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and the attached subject pool. To program the experiment, the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) was used. In total, 11 sessions with up to 24 subjects each were conducted, leading to a total of 206 participants 2 . All participants were students from the University of Duisburg-Essen. The experiment lasted about 150 minutes and average payo including the show-up fee of EUR 5.00 was EUR 27.39 (minimum EUR 0.10, maximum EUR 40.12). 3 Subjects were paid out one after the other to preserve anonymity.
Results

General picture
To get a general overview how the ex ante optimal solution looks like, Figure 2 illustrates the optimal consumption, cash-on-hand, and savings that are predicted for 30 periods. The stylized description of this is to save a lot (proportionately) in the early periods to build up a buer stock of cash-on-hand. This way, consumption can be smoothed and no immediate reaction to bad draws in the future is necessary. At the very end, all savings are of course consumed. Optimal consumption Optimal cash-on-hand Optimal savings
The subjects in our experiment came surprisingly close to this predicition. Figure 3 shows the average of the subjects' actual consumption paths, the ex-ante optimal consumption, and the average of the respective conditionally optimal consumptions. Again, some stylized observations can be made: In the 2 Of those, 4 subjects experienced technical problems and therefore are excluded from the analysis. 3 If decisions by the participant would have lead to negative payos which exceeded the show-up fee, the participant was warned by a pop-up screen and could change her decision. Average consumption Base treatment Ex ante optimum consumption Average of the respective conditionally optimum consumption very rst periods, overconsumption can be seen. A special case of this are some periods where the optimal consumption would have been 0 (recall that the negative utility one can incur is bounded from below) but the actual consumption is positive. In later rounds, the main dierence is the overreaction to high income shocks. This way, the consumption smoothing is not as good as it would be in the conditional optimum. However, overall the actual consumption is surprisingly close to the actual chosen consumption. Still, the average deviation from the conditional optimum is signicantly dierent from 0 in most rounds (only in rounds 14, 20, and 26 no signicant dierence can be found using a one sample t-test for each round).
The eect of information
Given that subjects' consumption decisions are surprisingly close to the optimum, we test, whether dierent amounts of information about the stochastic income have an inuence on this behavior. Figure  4 shows the average absolute deviation from the conditional optimum for each Info treatment and the Base treatment as a share of the xed income. Using pairwise exact Mann-Whitney U tests to compare behavior between treatments reveals signicant dierences only between the LowInfo treatment and the HighInfo treatment (p = 0.045). But, instead of improving consumption decisions, more information leads to larger deviations from the conditional optimum, if at all. This observation is not consistent over all rounds: The treatment eect is (at least weakly) signicant in rounds 2, 11, 12, 13, 18, and 21 (p < 0.094). It seems that very detailed information about the random process make subjects somewhat overcondent in their ability to determine the optimal consumption amount and, therefore, they tend to consume too much and save too little respectively. 4 Accordingly, the problem of undersaving (see above) is more sincere with more instead of less information. Figure 5 illustrates the actual consumption decisions, the cash-on-hand and the deviation from the conditional optimum observed in the two treatments for all 30 periods. The previous results suggest that very detailed information rather produces a feeling of better understanding instead of being really understood by subjects. The question is then whether the framing of the random process and, thus, own experiences with income shocks triggered by this framing, do aect undersaving. We particularly focus on framings that (currently) have rather negative connotations and, accordingly, might induce subjects to consume more carefully and reduce undersaving. Figure 6 includes the average absolute deviation from the conditional optimum for each Frame treatment and the Base treatment as a fraction of xed income. But neither the unemployment frame, nor the taxation frame, nor the general economic development frame of the random process signicantly aects behavior (p > 0.841). Obviously the observed undersaving in our experiment is rather robust to experiences with income shocks made outside the laboratory. Brown et al. (2009) reported that social learning in the form of seeing other subjects' decision improves consumption behavior. Our belief treatment tests whether social learning can be already induced by seeing other subjects' beliefs about the next income shock. Figure 7 illustrates the aggregate data observed in the Belief and in the Base treatment. However, no signicant dierence between the Belief and the Base treatment can be observed (p = 0.575). In contrast to seeing others' decisions, subjects do not benet when they are given access to the beliefs about future shocks. 
Panel estimation
In order to control for confounding inuences, a Random Eects panel estimation is conducted, using the log of absolute deviation from the conditional optimum as the dependent variable. An additional clustering at the group level is used for the participants in the Belief treatment who were informed about their group members' beliefs. Table 1 shows three dierent model specications which add further explaining variables. The rst specication includes only the treatment dummies with the baseline treatment as the reference treatment. The second one adds demographic variables (sex, age, a dummy for being an economics student, number of semesters, high school GPA), the number of test entries, and the subject's own belief. In addition, risk attitude, patience, and impulse control are included. 5 The third and nal specication also adds the period and the squared period to look for changes during the course of the experiment. In all specications, the treatment dummies are not signicant (the Base treatment is used as a baseline). However, in specications 2 and 3 a subject's belief, and number of test entries and in the full specication also the period and period squared, have a signicant inuence on behavior. The development of deviations over the thirty periods mirrors the results by Brown et al. (2009) as the decisions by the subjects actually get worse instead of better. This is in parts driven by the fact that the absolute scale of deviations just gets bigger as participants have a higher xed income and more cash-on-hand. However, using the deviation as a share of xed income instead yields the same qualitative results: deviations get larger in later rounds.
Looking at a subject's belief about the random adjustment factor in this round shows that a signicant, 5 These variables are evaluated on a 11-point scale with questions taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Signicance levels: *10% **5% ***1%
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Source: Own calculations.
14 slightly negative relation between the belief and the deviation exists. The existence of a relationship is somewhat puzzling, as the true adjustment factor for each round is drawn and shown to the subjects before they make their decision. Possibly, a subject's belief is an indicator for the anticipated general future development of the adjustment factor and, as such, inuences behavior. Adding the beliefs of the other group members as explaining variables shows that none of the other beliefs has a signicant inuence on a subjects' behavior. Thus, subjects seem to realize that all group members have the same information about the random adjustment factor and there is no need to take others' beliefs into account for their own consumption decision.
The eect of the number of test entries goes in the expected direction: The more entries in the Euro calculator a subject makes, the smaller is her deviation from the conditional optimum. However, the eect is pretty small in economic terms. Of course, one has to be careful in interpreting this signicance, as it does not indicate a causal eect from number of test entries to quality of the decision. Instead, participants who simply think about the problem for a longer time might use both more test entries and make better decisions.
Heuristics
In general, our results reveal that even with little information, consumption decisions are quite close to the optimum. Given that more information, if at all, rather increases deviations to the optimum level raises some doubts that subjects calculate the optimal solution. Instead, it might be that they rather use a naïve heuristic basing their consumption decision on easier accessible variables like cash-on-hand or xed income. To identify such simple decision rules, we run a regression (pooling all subjects) which explains the actual consumption decision by the predicted consumption, the available cash-on-hand, and the xed income. Table 2 shows the results from this regression. Signicance levels: *10% **5% ***1%
The regression results indicate that subjects do not consistently align their consumption to their cash-on-hand or their xed income. Instead, the optimal consumption is weakly signicantly correlated to their consumption decision. This observation suggests that subjects at least try to calculate the optimal decision though they are not able to account for all information necessary to determine this optimum.
Conclusion and discussion
The paper at hand uses a laboratory experiment to analyze the eect of dierent information conditions on consumption and savings behavior. The main results are twofold: First, the consumptions are -given the complex environment -pretty close to optimal decisions. Second, diering information conditions hardly aect the quality of the decisions. Especially the second result is somewhat surprising: The Info treatments tested here vary substantially from giving subjects almost no information at all about the random element of their future income to giving a full specication of the random term including example draws and the density function. Instead, if at all, more information seems to increase the deviation from the optimum. This suggests that subjects do not really use this information in the way assumed by standard models (i.e. thinking about their expected future utility) but instead employ some other way of dealing with the dicult decision situation. However, we can exclude simple decision rules that base the decision on easier accessible variables as a possible explanation. The observation that a considerable number of subjects use the Euro calculator (87% percent of the subjects use it in more than 25 periods) rather suggests that subjects at least try to calculate the optimum. Moreover, the fact that testing dierent consumption levels has a positive inuence on decision quality implies that subjects may benet even more from "learning by doing" than from thinking the model through right from the start. This mirrors the results by Brown et al. (2009) , who repeat the "lifetime" of a subject seven times and nd that decisions continually improve. It is also in line with our nding, that subjects do not benet from just seeing the others' beliefs about income shocks -which still requires some calculation to determine own consumption, but rather need to see the decisions made by others to improve consumption behavior (as reported by Brown et al., 2009) . Still, the exact method people use to arrive at their actual spending decisions is not clear. Future research might try to open the "black box" of the consumption decision and analyze how consumers are able to consistently make good decisions.
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The experiment consists of thirty rounds. In each of these rounds you have to decide how to split your available money between saving and spending. The current round is displayed at the top of the screen. Your money is denoted in the unit experimental currency (EW).
Available money
Your available money consists of two parts: Your savings from earlier rounds and your current income. It is denoted in EW.
Available money = Savings + current income
Current income
In each round, you receive a current income. This current income also consists of two parts: a xed income and a variable adjustment factor.
Current income = Fixed income x variable adjustment factor
The xed income is 100 EW in the rst round and increases by 5% in each round afterwards. In the second round your xed income is therefore 105 EW, in the third round 110.25 EW etc.
Variable adjustment factor
The adjustment factor is variable, because in each round there is a chance to become unemployed. A low adjustment factor -and the resulting low current income -therefore represents high unemployment.
The adjustment factor is variable, because the overall economic situation is taken into account in each round. A low adjustment factor -and the resulting low current income -therefore represents a bad economic situation.
The adjustment factor is variable, because in each round the tax policy can be changed. A low adjustment factor -and the resulting low current income -therefore represents tax policy which puts high taxes on income.
The adjustment factor is determined using a probability distribution, therefore it is determined ran- The expected value of the adjustment factor is 1. When many adjustment factors are determined randomly, the average of their values will be 1.
The expected value of the adjustment factor is 1. When many adjustment factors are determined randomly, the average of their values will be 1. In addition, in about 10% of all cases the adjustment factor will be smaller than 0.168. In about 10% of all cases it will be larger than 2.185. In ca. 80% of all cases the adjustment factor will be between 0.168 and 2.185.
Your estimation of the adjustment factor
Before your decision about saving and spending you have to estimate in every round, which adjustment factor will be determined in the current round. Please enter your estimation in the eld Estimation on the screen.
Before your decision you are informed about the estimations about the adjustment factor which have been made by four other participants. These four participants are assigned randomly to you and stay the same for all 30 rounds.
Information after each round
In each round, a table shows savings, xed income, adjustment factor, and the resulting available money. The values of the past rounds are also displayed in the table.
Your decision
Please enter your decision how much of your available money you want to spend in the current round (and with it indirectly how much you want to save) in the eld Your decision.
The amount of EW which you spend in each round is converted to Eurocent. 
